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Abstract 
A federal government system creates opportunities for proponents and opponents of environmental 
policy change to shift the institutional home where a policy decision is made and then invoke rea-
soning tailored for the new venue and to retry or reframe arguments. Content analysis of North 
Dakota state legislative and US Congressional committee hearings preceding authorization of an 
outlet connecting Devils Lake, North Dakota to the binational Hudson Bay drainage basin revealed: 
(1) State and federal legislators were equally likely to invoke constituents’ localized concerns in fram-
ing arguments, and (2) Scientific evidence did not hold sway in either state or federal hearings. 
 
Keywords: venue shopping, elite framing, federalism, science in legislative deliberations, water di-
version, Devils Lake, North Dakota 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2005, the State of North Dakota built an outlet that reconnected Devils Lake to the bi-
national Hudson Bay drainage basin, in which it is physically located, through the Shey-
enne River, a tributary of the Red River flowing into Canada. For a millennium, Devils 
Lake has been a closed watershed susceptible to extreme fluctuations in water levels 
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(Kempf, 2007). By unilaterally building the Devils Lake outlet, the State of North Dakota 
blurred a key historical division upon which US federal authority to make international 
treaties rested, the “sharp distinction between what is foreign and what is domestic, be-
tween what is external and what is internal” (Bradley, 1998, p. 391). State actions with im-
plications in another sovereign nation fundamentally challenge the historic understanding 
of foreign policy as the exclusive domain of federal government (Ku, 2006). Indeed, the 
State of North Dakota action illustrates what Ku (2006, p. 2384) terms “governatorial for-
eign policy,” when a state executive official acts independently of the federal government 
to implicate relations between the United States and another country. 
Such independence has considerable ramifications for the US federal system, in which 
relationships among governments have been characterized as polycentric (Ostrom, 1973) 
and noncentralized (Elazar, 1987). With multiple power centers in a noncentralized system, 
each has its own authorities and competencies, with none dominating the others (Schlager 
& Blomquist, 2008). The distinguishing feature of federalism is the simultaneous emphasis 
on achieving self-rule and shared rule (Elazar, 1987). Schlager and Blomquist (2008) note 
two important implications arising from this form of governance. First, mutual consent 
and consensus building are the bedrock of joint action. Participants must consider each 
other because of the multiple veto points in the structure and the constitutional protections 
provided to citizens and governments. Second, strengthening constituent units, support-
ing their coordination and communication capacities and providing dispute resolution 
mechanisms strengthens the polycentric system. 
What happens, however, when one of the participants in a federal system is dissatisfied 
with the prospect of joint action and has the authority and means to decline to participate? 
This is what happened in 2005, when the North Dakota state government opted to con-
struct its own outlet for Devils Lake rather than contribute to building a US Army Corps 
of Engineers–designed outlet with more effective environmental safeguards (Kempf, 2007). 
The parallel debates occurring in legislative committees at the federal and state level 
about whether or not to build a Devils Lake outlet provide a valuable opportunity to ex-
plore the extent to which localized concerns are invoked in arguments, as well as whether 
exposure to scientific arguments is different in a setting heavily dominated by local con-
cerns compared to another that is not. The political debate over constructing the outlet 
revealed a conflict of interest based on differing goals, as one would anticipate from the 
principal-agent model characterizing the dynamic between federal and state governments. 
Chubb (1985) argued tensions could be heightened when access to information is asym-
metric. In deciding to authorize funds for construction of an outlet with more environmen-
tal safeguards, were federal legislators exposed to more science-based evidence than their 
state counterparts, who opted for an outlet with fewer environmental safeguards? Was the 
debate framed differently in these two settings? 
In light of these questions we pose two hypotheses: (1) State legislators, given their 
closer proximity to constituents (see Maestas, 2003; Mooney, 1995), are more likely to in-
voke localized concerns in their framing of issues than are federal legislators; and (2) Given 
larger constraints on staff and institutional resources (see Hedlund, 1984; Mooney, 1991), 
as well as less professionalization (see Squire, 2007), state legislators will hear from both 
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fewer scientific experts and a less diverse range of experts than will their Congressional 
counterparts. 
We seek to test our hypotheses by analyzing the use of framing and language within 
federal and state legislative committee hearings. Policymakers are uniquely positioned to 
influence policy images through the strategic emphasis of the frames and symbols attached 
to policy issues (see Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Stone, 2001; Wagner, 2009), and those 
frames and symbols act as useful windows into both the preferences of and informational 
resources available to policymakers. We focus particularly upon the frames employed by 
elites, their use of scientific information, and the composition of hearing witnesses to dif-
ferentiate between the strategies of policymakers at these differing levels of government. 
There have been few empirical analyses of policy framing in Congress (but see Gruszczyn-
ski & Michaels, 2012; Harris, 2009; Newton, 2008; Tzoumis, 2001), with even less research 
covering policy framing at the state level (but see Reich & Mendoza, 2008). We are unaware 
of other policy framing studies examining federal and state legislative committees concur-
rently. 
We begin by sketching a brief account of some of the background of the controversy 
over authorizing construction of the initial outlet from Devils Lake, North Dakota. We then 
consider how policy entrepreneurs target a decision setting to promote their chosen policy 
options. The literature on framing, particularly elite framing, is considered next and inte-
grated into the academic literature on the constraints of state legislative bodies on policy-
makers’ behavior. Attention then turns to the methodology underlying our analysis and 
presentation of the results of this research, focusing specifically upon key differences in 
how federal and state policymakers differ in their framing of and use of knowledge rele-
vant to the policy issue at hand. In the discussion that follows we highlight the ramifica-
tions of the primacy of local considerations in political argumentation. 
 
2. Background to construction of the 2005 Devils Lake outlet 
 
For much of the last 4,000 years Devils Lake, North Dakota, has experienced wide fluctu-
ations in its water level. During this time, it spilled out in the Sheyenne River, a tributary 
of the Red River, at least twice. In 1992 the water level began to rise rapidly, causing flood-
ing in the communities and farmland surrounding the lake (Whorley, 2008). Between 1993 
and 2004 the lake quadrupled in volume, rising 24.5 feet and causing $450 million in flood 
damages (Hearne, 2007). 
Consequently, in 2005 the State of North Dakota built an emergency water diversion 
project to relieve flooding within the 3,800-square mile Devils Lake basin. This project in-
volved pumping water from Devils Lake into a canal draining into the nearby Sheyenne 
River (Hearne, 2007). The Sheyenne River is a tributary of the Red River, which flows into 
the Province of Manitoba, Canada, eventually emptying into Lake Winnipeg, the site of 
multimillion-dollar subsistence, commercial, and recreational fisheries. Devils Lake had 
until then been a closed basin. Building an outlet introduced the prospect of transferring 
non-native biota into the Hudson Bay drainage basin to which Devils Lake had not been 
connected for about 1,000 years. The scope of the biological threat from the transfer of vi-
ruses, bacteria, fish parasites, and nonadult fish was not well understood when the initial 
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outlet was constructed (Whorley, 2008). At the time of outlet construction there was con-
cern about introducing the more degraded water quality of Devils Lake into the Red River 
system. Without flow through and as a sink for runoff from the surrounding farmland, 
Devils Lake water had become heavily polluted over the course of human settlement in 
the region (Ma, Hipel, & De, 2011). 
The Devils Lake water diversion project had to be closed 10 days after it was opened in 
August 2005 due to the high levels of sulfates found in the Sheyenne River, the river into 
which the outlet drained. Returning the outlet to operation required the North Dakota 
State Health Department to raise the maximum allowable sulfate concentration level in the 
Sheyenne River (Ma et al., 2011). In 2011 the International Joint Commission released a 
scientific report indicating waters from Devils Lake did not present a definite threat to the 
downstream water quality and ecology of waters flowing through the Canadian Province 
of Manitoba (Bensley et al., 2011). 
In opting to build its own outlet for US$28 million, the State of North Dakota rejected a 
Congressionally authorized project for fiscal year 2003 estimated to cost US$186.5 million, 
for which the State would have been responsible for paying 35% (US$64.9 million) and the 
annual operating costs of about US$3 million (Kempf, 2007). Funding was conditioned 
upon federal/state cost sharing, the Devils Lake flooding constituting an emergency ac-
cording to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the con-
struction being of an acceptable standard and complying with the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, and it not violating the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the 
United States and Canada (United States Congress, 2002). Since the state-constructed outlet 
did not involve US federal funds or jurisdiction, it was not subject to major federal over-
sight, including being economically justified, undergoing an environmental impact assess-
ment, or satisfying the terms of an international treaty. The North Dakota project did not 
include environmental safeguards comparable to what would have been required by a 
project involving the federal government (Whorley, 2008). This outcome was more in line 
with Adler’s (2007) contention that federal government efforts to protect the environment 
tend to surpass state efforts, rather than Potoski’s (2001) assertion that states regularly ex-
ceed federal environmental standards. 
While the specifics of the federal outlet project were never fully sketched out, they in-
cluded installation of a sand filter for removal of particulates larger than two microns in 
size, as well as reducing mercury, nitrogen, and phosphorous particulates (Whorley, 2008). 
Using federal funds would have necessitated satisfying water quality standards and envi-
ronmental regulations laid out in the US National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Boundary Waters Treaty (Ma, 2008). 
The dispute over the discharge of Devils Lake water strained Canada-US transboundary 
water relations (Whorley, 2008). In large part this was because the Boundary Waters Treaty 
(the Treaty) of 1909 and the International Joint Commission (IJC), created by the Treaty to 
prevent and resolve disputes over water flowing across and between the two countries, 
were not brought into play before the outlet was constructed (Whorley, 2008). The Treaty 
provides a framework for amicable bilateral, international water relations (Kempf, 2007) 
in part because of the historical expectation that treaty laws trump state laws (Bradley, 
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1998) and that the federal government will deliver subnational government compliance 
(Swaine, 2003). 
The State of North Dakota proceeded with constructing the Devils Lake outlet notwith-
standing US federal government disapproval. There was much concern about operating 
outside the Treaty framework and broader bilateral relationships. The fear was about es-
tablishing a precedent for affirming unilateral action, one-off solutions shaped by local in-
terests and avoiding an appropriate environmental assessment (Whorley, 2008). 
 
3. Venue shopping 
 
The controversy over building an outlet for Devils Lake exemplifies a wicked problem be-
cause it involves considerable conflict over goals, significant technical disputes, and mul-
tiple actors operating at different government scales (Hoppe & Peterse, 1993). It is this last 
attribute that made venue shopping a viable option for policy entrepreneurs who wished 
to see the Devils Lake outlet constructed. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p. 32) define ven-
ues as “institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made.” These include Con-
gress and state legislatures. Venue shopping refers to policy entrepreneurs seeking out a 
decision setting to promote policy options different from those in place. Successfully mov-
ing decision-making authority to a new venue can result in achieving significant policy 
change stymied in the previous venue (Pralle, 2003). The advocacy coalition framework 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999) and the punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgart-
ner & Jones, 1993), conceptualizations of policy change, ratify venue shopping as an essen-
tial component of both the policy process and political strategies (Pralle, 2003). 
While Lindblom (1968) and Rose (1976) argued that political systems composed of mul-
tiple policy venues hinder policy development because changes can be blocked in a num-
ber of venues (Pralle, 2003), Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p. 240; emphasis in original) 
argue that “many venues of politics work against conservatism.” This is because multiple 
venues make possible venue shopping, which in the punctuated equilibrium model is one 
driver of policy system turbulence (Pralle, 2003). These alternative venues allow dissatis-
fied policymakers to sidestep obstacles rather than confront them. 
In the context of a federal system, venue shopping can be understood as policy entre-
preneurs’ efforts to exploit what Bednar (2011, p. 275) describes as “competition over the 
boundaries of authority” between state and federal governments. Opportunism is under-
standable and to be expected in a federation where governments are amenable to testing 
the rules distributing authority (Bednar, 2006, 2009, 2011). 
Evidence of venue shopping is widespread. It has been employed by policymakers, ad-
vocacy groups, and social movements when they have not achieved their desired ends at 
different stages of the policymaking process. Such stages include policy agenda-setting, 
adoption, and implementation, in pursuing a range of causes, such as the environment, 
civil rights, anti-abortion, and tobacco control (Ginsberg, 1989; Handler, 1978; McAdam, 
1982; Pralle, 2003; Rabe, 2013). Through venue shopping, policymakers can exploit the dif-
ferences in venues in terms of “rules of access and participation, their procedures govern-
ing decision-making, their constituencies, and the incentives facing institutional actors” 
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and the policy solutions they can generate (Pralle, 2003, p. 237). For example, state govern-
ments may have more or less capacity to deal with a policy problem than the federal gov-
ernment (Pralle, 2003). Consequently, we can anticipate different framing strategies in 
different venues as policymakers adapt their policy claims to the venue. 
 
4. Framing and legislative hearings 
 
The use of frames in describing the political world serves to scope the range of considera-
tions policymakers use in addressing social problems (Steensland, 2008). Frames are “cen-
tral organizing ideas that provide meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). The 
myriad ways in which policy issues are framed by elites is very important to our under-
standing of policy change and process (see Lasswell, Lerner, & de Sola Pool, 1952; Straus, 
2011). The success or failure of legislative attempts to make policy often pivots on which 
side in a debate manages to dominate the language surrounding the policy, including the 
strategic emphasis on certain characteristics of an issue at the expense of others. Much of 
the research in this area confirms the strategic nature of defining and redefining issues 
(Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1988; Tarry, 2001). For example, policy issues are strategi-
cally defined and framed by advocacy groups and policymakers to gain the attention of 
other policymakers and the public (Pralle, 2003). Successful framing attempts alter not only 
how individuals think about policies but also the degree of support or opposition they give 
to policies and their targets (see Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008; Gerrity, 2009; 
Newton, 2008). 
Framing reflects image manipulation, a critical tactic in venue shopping. Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993, p. 36) note “changes in image are used purposefully, . . . to attract the 
attention of the members of a particular venue.” Proponents redefine an issue “to suit the 
discourse and norms of the institutions they are soliciting for support” (Pralle, 2003, p. 
242). For example, “to move an issue to the subnational level” requires highlighting “the 
local origins or impacts of the policy problem so as to engage policymakers and publics at 
the local level” (Pralle, 2003, p. 242). 
When framing attempts are unsuccessful in one venue, policymakers have the option of 
spurring policy change by shifting to a new policy venue and either promoting their exist-
ing framing or an alternative policy problem definition. While Pralle (2003) argues political 
systems with multiple venues make it possible for outsiders to promote new policy prob-
lem definitions with associated new solutions, we argue a new venue provides insiders 
with a second chance to promote variations of existing problem definitions and solutions. 
The complexity inherent in public policy means there are numerous potential avenues 
to take in framing issues (May, Sapotichne, &Workman, 2006). The process of dominant 
frames emerging and persisting over time means many of these potentialities lie dormant, 
unused for much or all of a policy debate’s life cycle (see Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2009; 
Baumgartner et al., 2008; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989). These dormant frames have 
the potential to shift to a preeminent position with the occurrence of external punctuations 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2009) or focusing events (Kingdon, 2010), often with conse-
quences of upending the once-dominant policy monopoly in that issue area. Elites thus 
have an intrinsically strategic motivation to highlight policy considerations amenable to 
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their preferences at the expense of other considerations that may be detrimental to their 
cause. 
Elite framing in general has gained much attention in the last decade of framing re-
search, even while the literature on elite framing in Congress is somewhat under-studied 
(but see Harris, 2010; Newton, 2008; Tzoumis, 2001); in research on state legislatures, the 
situation is even more acute (but see Reich & Mendoza, 2008). Studies have repeatedly 
shown that elites proactively attempt to shape the terms of debate through framing in a 
variety of issue areas, including race (Kellstedt, 2005), abortion (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, 
& Rucht, 2002; Gerrity, 2009), the environment (Tzoumis, 2001), taxes (Schaffner & Atkin-
son, 2009), nuclear energy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989), 
health care (Jerit, 2008), poverty (Iyengar, 1994), welfare (Stone, 2011; Schneider & Ingram, 
1997), and the death penalty (Baumgartner et al., 2008). 
The importance of framing strategies in attaining legislative success is nowhere more 
evident than in policy debates within the US Congress and state legislatures. Elite framing 
at the federal level continues to receive considerable attention among academics, but lack-
ing is an understanding of elite framing at the state level (but see Nie, 2004; Reich & Men-
doza, 2008). While we might anticipate elites at this level of government to engage in 
strategic framing similarly to their federal counterparts, distinctive characteristics of state 
level political participation may instead lead to important differences in framing attempts. 
Since state legislators spend more time in their home states than federal legislators who 
commute to Washington, DC they tend to be more accessible and connected to their con-
stituencies than their federal counterparts. As a result, they are more responsive to the 
demands of their constituents, their colleagues, and their political party, especially when 
they aspire to either retain their current offices or obtain higher office (Jewell, 1982; Maes-
tas, 2003). Of course federal legislators with the same aspirations also are subject to these 
pressures (see Fiorina, 1974). 
Responsiveness to constituents’ demands might affect legislative policy framing in that 
state elites, given constituency proximity, have more incentives than do their federal coun-
terparts to balance their personal and partisan preferences with the preferences of their 
constituents (Reich & Mendoza, 2008). In a study of the effects of state legislature charac-
teristics on public opinion, Squire (1993) found that legislators with smaller constituencies 
tended to receive more contact from citizens than those with larger constituencies. Conse-
quently, we posit that North Dakota State Assembly legislators are better positioned than 
their federal counterparts to frame policies as beneficial to key constituencies and thereby 
are better able to accrue support from constituents (Reich & Mendoza, 2008). This brings 
us to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: State legislators will be more likely to invoke local or state-level concerns in committee 
deliberations than their counterparts in Congress. 
 
The second piece of this research puzzle involves the differences in the information federal 
and state legislators will use in framing issues. Much of this has to do with variations in 
resources at the state and federal legislative levels. The US Congress is highly profession-
alized and employs large legislative and committee staffs, has impressive informational 
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resources in repositories and agencies, and has a highly specialized hierarchy of commit-
tees (see Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2009). 
The resources available to state legislatures, on the other hand, are much more varied 
(Moncrief, Thompson, & Cassie, 1996). For example, legislative bodies in more populous 
states, such as the New York State Assembly or California State Legislature, are character-
ized by higher informational resources and staffing budgets than smaller legislatures, such 
as the North Dakota State Assembly or the Nebraska Unicameral legislature. As such, we 
should expect, compared to their federal counterparts, that North Dakota State Assembly 
members will have fewer resources in the form of scientific expertise, institutionalized 
agency knowledge, and fewer staff and library resources to access information on the ef-
fects of policymaking activities. This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: State legislators will hear from (1) fewer experts and (2) a less diverse range of experts 
than will their Congressional counterparts due to lower informational, institutional, and 
staff structures. 
 
We turn now to the methods employed in this research. 
 
5. Methods 
 
We obtained 17 committee documents related to building an outlet from Devils Lake, one 
hearing from the US Congress, specifically the US Senate, and 16 sets of minutes from the 
North Dakota State Assembly, eight in the North Dakota Senate and eight in the North 
Dakota House of Representatives. See table 1 for a breakdown of hearings coded in the 
analysis. Each of the documents was content analyzed by loading them individually into 
PDF-markup software and annotating each frame, affiliation of the frame’s speaker, and 
whether the speaker was an expert witness such as a scientist or engineer. Following com-
pletion of the initial markup, we entered frame occurrences into an Excel spreadsheet and 
imported the resulting dataset into statistical software for subsequent analysis. 
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Table 1. Hearings analyzed related to the initial outlet from Devils Lake, North Dakota 
 Date Committee Hearing Title 
US Senate 23 Oct. 1997 Environment and Public Works 
Flood Control at 
   Devils Lake 
North Dakota House of 
   Representatives 23 Oct. 1997 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 11 Dec. 1997 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 19 Feb. 1998 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 9 Jun 1998 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 17 Sept. 1998 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 21 June 1999 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 17 Sept. 1999 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
 5 July 2000 Garrison Diversion Overview Minutes 
North Dakota Senate 10 Oct. 2001 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 12 Aug. 2009 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 15 Mar. 2010 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 14 June 2010 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 20 Sept. 2010 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 12 July 2011 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 30 Aug. 2011 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 10 Oct. 2011 Water-Related Topics Minutes 
 
Following Gamson and Modigliani (1987, p. 143), frames were operationalized as a 
“central organizing idea or story line” providing context by highlighting one concern ra-
ther than others. We conducted precoding on a randomized subset of the documents to 
surmise which frames would likely be encountered in the research, arriving at a set of 185 
possible frames (see Weber, 1990). We opted to create a frame set of high specificity for 
purposes of removing as much ambiguity as possible in forming text-frame combinations, 
as per Gamson and Modigliani (1987, 1989); (see also Wagner, 2009). As a result, our set of 
frame codes includes a large number of possible codes. Examples of possible frames in-
clude “downstream water quality concerns are not serious” and “increase water recrea-
tion.” See appendix 1 for an exhaustive list of frames coded in this analysis. 
In total, 477 frames were found and coded in this analysis. Intercoder reliability was 
assessed by taking a random subset of 10% of the hearing documents and subjecting it to 
analysis by another coder; the sample selected ended up accounting for 34% of the total set 
of frames coded in the analysis. We selected Krippendorff’s alpha as a measure of coder 
reliability because of the procedure’s ability to account for disagreement that is due to 
chance or disagreement due to systematic disagreement (see Krippendorff, 2003). Our ini-
tial reliability check netted α =.968, a high degree of agreement, suggesting that our coding 
scheme is reliable. 
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6. Results 
 
We first turn to Hypothesis 1, which posited state legislators would invoke more state and 
local concerns in committee hearings than their federal counterparts. Table 2 presents the 
frames used by state legislators in the North Dakota State Assembly ranked by frequency 
of frame occurrence. 
 
Table 2. Frames used by state legislators in North Dakota State Assembly Legislative Committee 
Hearings pertaining to constructing an initial Devils Lake outlet 
Frame Percent of Total Frames? Frequency 
Economic impact of floods 33.3% 3 
Loss of homes from floods 33.3% 3 
Impact of floods on transportation 11.1% 1 
Impact of floods on dikes 11.1% 1 
Need to examine downstream water quality 11.1% 1 
 
A total of nine frame instances were coded for North Dakota committee meetings, and 
the frames employed by North Dakota state policymakers are telling. With the exception 
of the “need to examine downstream water quality frame,” which occurred once, all of the 
frames used by state policymakers emphasized localized concerns, specifically the impact 
of uncontrolled water on the local economy, homes, transportation, and flood control 
mechanisms. None of the frames used by these policymakers focused on the potential ben-
efits of an outlet from Devils Lake, instead emphasizing the consequences of not having 
an outlet on the economy and infrastructure of the state. 
Contrast these findings with table 3, which presents the frames employed in the 1997 
US Senate committee hearing related to constructing the initial Devils Lake outlet. The 
most frequently used frame emphasized that there was no connection between the outlet 
and a controversial inlet proposed previously as part of a larger project to divert water 
from the Missouri River. Similar to their state legislative counterparts, federal policymak-
ers spent a fair amount of time highlighting the ongoing consequences of not having an 
outlet, including the loss of homes (7 instances), economic impacts (5), loss of medical ser-
vices resulting from roads made impassible by flooding (4), impact of floods generally on 
transportation (3), decreased water quality resulting from flooding (2), and degraded wa-
ter quality in general (2). Moreover, we found that members of the North Dakota delega-
tion to Congress were just as likely to emphasize local concerns as their state counterparts 
when promoting the construction of an outlet from Devils Lake. 
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Table 3. Frames used by North Dakota federal legislators in the 1997 Senate Hearing (1997) 
pertaining to constructing an initial Devils Lake outlet 
Frame Percent of Total Frames Frequency 
No connection between inlet/outlet plans 11.7% 11 
Water stability from outlet 10.6% 10 
Loss of homes from floods 7.5% 7 
Improved water quality from outlet 5.3% 5 
Downstream water quality concerns not serious 5.3% 5 
Economic impact from flooding 5.3% 5 
Must take holistic approach to solution 4.3% 4 
Not enough time to evaluate environmental impact 4.3% 4 
Impact of flooding on medical services 4.3% 4 
Economic benefits outweigh costs 4.3% 4 
Outlet must be environmentally sound 3.2% 3 
Impact of drought on agriculture 3.2% 3 
Impact of flooding on transportation 3.2% 3 
Downstream water quality impact from outlet 2.1% 2 
River water quality impact from flooding 2.1% 2 
Uncontrolled water quality without outlet 2.1% 2 
Outlet will comply with NEPA 2.1% 2 
 
In the Senate committee hearing, the North Dakota delegation also highlighted benefits 
to be accrued from outlet construction aside from alleviating flooding in their home state. 
These included improved consistency of water resources (10) and better water quality (5). 
North Dakota federal elected officials challenged criticisms of outlet construction, contend-
ing downstream water quality concerns were exaggerated (5), the economic benefits of the 
proposed infrastructure outweighed the costs (4), and outlet construction would comply 
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Pertaining to this last point though, 
these policymakers stressed there was not enough time to evaluate the environmental im-
pact of the proposed outlet as required by NEPA. 
Given these findings, our first hypothesis does not hold. Regardless of whether the 
venue was federal or state, North Dakota policymakers emphasized local concerns, nota-
bly past impacts of unregulated Devils Lake water levels. 
We move next to the second hypothesis, which posited given fewer legislative resources 
at the state level, a committee hearing of the North Dakota State Assembly would feature 
both less expert testimony and a less diverse range of experts (whether testimony is in the 
form of scientific or engineering expertise) than a Congressional committee hearing. Table 
4 presents a breakdown of engineering and scientific expert testimony featured in federal 
and state hearings about constructing an initial outlet from Devils Lake. 
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Table 4. Expert testimony by engineers and scientists at federal and state legislative committee 
hearings on the initial Devils Lake outlet 
 US Senate  N.D. State Assembly 
 Percent Frequency  Percent Frequency 
Engineers 11.33% 35  41.67% 70 
Scientists 2.91% 9  4.76% 8 
    χ2 = 2.44, p =.118 
Note: Percentages are the proportion of total statements within the total of each venue’s hearings. 
 
The table presents the number of statements as a percentage of all hearing statements 
from experts, with either an engineering or scientific background, who testified in these 
hearings. Engineers figured much more prominently in federal and state hearings than did 
scientists. In both the North Dakota and federal committee hearings concerned with con-
struction of a Devils Lake outlet, engineers emphasized the need for proposed infrastruc-
ture for a variety of reasons, including mitigating flooding, the technical feasibility of 
outlet-related infrastructure, the impact of flooding on flood control mechanisms, and the 
loss of homes due to flooding. Additionally, engineers in both the state and federal hear-
ings claimed an outlet would decrease water salinity and improve water quality. 
There were nine statements by scientists in the federal hearing and eight statements in 
the state hearings. The Chi-square test of the table figures reveals no significant pattern of 
relationship between the amount of testimony from either scientists or engineers across 
the two hearing venues (χ2 = 2.44, p = .118). In other words, the breakdown of the number 
of engineers and scientists presenting their expertise within the hearings did not differ 
between venues to a systematic extent. Thus, our second hypothesis was rejected: the 
North Dakota Legislative Assembly did not hear from fewer expert witnesses than did 
their federal counterparts. 
Table 5 provides the breakdown of the affiliations of scientists testifying about the pro-
posed Devils Lake diversion in the federal and state committee hearings about the con-
struction of a Devils Lake outlet. While 100% of expert scientific testimony in the Senate 
committee hearing originated from members of natural resources agencies, only 25% orig-
inated from such agencies in the North Dakota legislative committee meetings about con-
structing a Devils Lake outlet. The other 75% of scientists testifying in the North Dakota 
hearings were associated with public health agencies. There was a significant difference in 
the pattern of association between the two hearings (χ2 = 17.0, p =.002). In other words, 
there was a systematic difference in the affiliations of scientific experts testifying between 
the two venues, with more expert testimony provided by those affiliated with natural re-
source agencies in the US Congress and more expert testimony provided by those affiliated 
with public health agencies in the North Dakota Legislative Assembly. 
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Table 5. Affiliation of scientists testifying in federal and state legislative committee hearings 
about the Devils Lake outlet 
 US Senate  N.D. State Assembly 
 Percent Frequency  Percent Frequency 
Natural resources agencies 100% 9  25% 2 
Public health agencies 0% 0  75% 6 
    χ2 = 17.0, p =.002 
Note: Percentages are the proportion of total statements within the total of each venue’s hearings. 
 
Scientists contributing expert testimony framed their arguments in similar ways in both 
federal and state committee hearings. For example, scientists testifying in the North Da-
kota Legislative Assembly committee hearings emphasized the need to protect down-
stream water quality, to engage in water treatment, and the water flowing from the outlet 
must meet water quality standards. Likewise, scientific testimony in the salient Senate 
committee hearing, much of which came from the staff of the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources, stated the environmental impact of the outlet must be investigated, as 
well as the potential impact on downstream water of Devils Lake water and a need to 
protect downstream water quality. Ron Norgang, a representative from the Minnesota De-
partment of Natural Resources also made the connection between Devils Lake inlet and 
outlet plans. Additionally, David Schorr, a representative from the Missouri Department 
of Resources emphasized the outlet would not solve flooding problems, the necessity of 
studying potential downstream water quality impacts, the need to conduct environmental 
impact studies, and the connection between plans for an inlet and outlet for Devils Lake. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
While mutual consent and consensus building may be at the heart of joint action in federal 
forms of government (Schlager & Blomquist, 2008), such an approach may be bypassed 
completely when one government unit in a federal system can proceed unilaterally. The 
State of North Dakota was able to decline Congress’ offer of constructing jointly an initial 
outlet for Devils Lake. North Dakota’s rejection of federal funding is in line with the in-
creasing frequency with which states are turning down federal funding for a range of is-
sues including abstinence-only education for teenagers, federal stimulus funding, the arts, 
and setting up health insurance exchanges (Doan & McFarlane, 2012). Partisanship and 
ideology in these other cases may have driven states to defy the expectation of their max-
imizing intergovernmental revenue (Doan & McFarlane, 2012). 
It is hard to make the case that constructing the initial outlet from Devils Lake was 
simply a function of partisanship in either Congress or the North Dakota State Assembly. 
For example, on 23 January 2003, the two US Senators from North Dakota, Byron Dorgan 
and Kent Conrad, both Democrats, attached a rider to the fiscal year 2003 omnibus spend-
ing bill, H.J. Res 2. The rider authorized $100 million for the Corps of Engineers’ Devils 
Lake Project, waiving the requirement that benefits must exceed costs of Corps projects 
and eliminating the necessity of consulting Canadian officials on the project. Republican 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
14 
Senator John McCain of Arizona, Democratic Senator Mark Dayton of Minnesota, and Re-
publican Senator Norm Coleman of Minnesota introduced an amendment to remove the 
rider from the omnibus spending bill. Their amendment was defeated by a vote of 62 votes 
to 35 with four senators not voting. The 62 votes to kill the bill were cast by 28 (45%) Re-
publicans and 34 (55%) Democrats. The 35 votes in support of the amendment were cast 
by 23 Republicans (68%) and 11 Democrats (32%). All four Senators who did not vote were 
Democrats. 
In the North Dakota State Assembly there was likewise overwhelming bipartisan sup-
port for constructing the initial outlet. This was apparent in three bills focused exclusively 
on making a state-funded Devils Lake outlet happen after North Dakota Senate Bill No. 
2188 authorized $20 million for a Devils Lake outlet as part of a bill encompassing state-
wide water development and bonds in 1999 (North Dakota Senate, 1999). In both 2001 and 
2003, bills were passed with overwhelming majorities to extend the State Water Commis-
sion’s authority to issue bonds to construct an outlet from Devils Lake for two years. In 
2001, while there were 10 state representatives who did not cast a vote to support the ex-
tension, of the 88 who did vote, 28 were Democrats and 60 were Republicans (North Da-
kota House, 2001, p. 950). In 2001 46 of the 49 Senators voted for the extension, 14 Demo-
crats and 32 Republicans. Of the three Senators who voted against the extension that year 
two were Democrats and one was a Republican (North Dakota Senate, 2001, p. 623). Two 
years later two of the Representatives did not vote while 92 voted in favor, 26 Democrats 
and 66 Republicans (North Dakota House, 2003, p. 963). For the same bill all of the Sena-
tors, 16 Democrats and 31 Republicans supported the extension (North Dakota Senate, 
2003, p. 1027). More controversial was the 57th Legislative Assembly House Bill 1151 de-
leting the requirement that federal government participate in constructing the Devils Lake 
outlet before bonds may be issued and authorizing the State Water Commission to use 
“quick take” eminent domain to acquire property for constructing the Devils Lake outlet. 
Nonetheless there was widespread bipartisan support for the bill. It passed in the State 
House of Representatives by a vote of 78 to 20, with 26 Democrats and 52 Republicans 
supporting the bill and with four Democrats and 16 Republicans opposed (North Dakota 
House, 2001, p. 372). Forty-six Senators voted in favor of the bill, 14 Democrats and 32 
Republicans while two Democrats and one Senator voted against it (North Dakota Senate, 
2001, p. 881). 
The State of North Dakota’s decision to build the initial outlet can be understood prag-
matically by looking at the financial implications for the North Dakota taxpayer: the cost 
of participating in fiscal federalism far exceeded what it cost to go it alone. What is note-
worthy given both the State’s financial pragmatism in proceeding without federal involve-
ment and our interest in venue shopping is that proponents of constructing a Devils Lake 
outlet invested so much effort first in trying to get Congress to support building an outlet 
on terms acceptable to the State of North Dakota. 
The reference to the connection between plans for an inlet and an outlet to Devils Lake 
by elected members from North Dakota and Minnesota and by testifying experts from the 
Minnesota Department of Resources and the Missouri Department of Resources in the Sen-
ate committee hearing we investigated provides an important clue as to why Congress was 
the initial venue of choice for those advocating for an outlet from Devils Lake in the late 
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twentieth and early twenty-first century. Beginning with the 1944 Flood Control Act, the 
North Dakota Congressional delegation has advocated for a succession of schemes divert-
ing water from the Missouri River in North Dakota to provide central and eastern North 
Dakota with irrigation, municipal water supplies, and water-based recreation (Gruszczyn-
ski & Michaels, 2012). In some of these schemes it was proposed that Devils Lake be turned 
into a reservoir with water coming into it from the Missouri River and water from it going 
into the Hudson Bay Drainage Basin. The prospect of interbasin water transfer was a 
highly controversial prospect on ecological and economic grounds. This history had two 
implications for the late twentieth/early twenty-first century debate about building an out-
let to alleviate flooding in the Devils Lake Basin. First, proponents of the outlet for flood 
relief had to make it clear their proposal was not a first step in developing interbasin water 
transfer. Second, having not seen North Dakota benefit as much as anticipated from the 
1944 Flood Control Act, members of the North Dakota State delegation and their allies 
worked hard to attain compensatory water infrastructure largess, such as an outlet from 
Devils Lake, from Congress. When these efforts did not result in a proposal acceptable to 
the State of North Dakota, outlet proponents turned to the North Dakota State Assembly. 
Being able to take unilateral action as a response to localized concerns speaks to the 
viability of shifting from a venue requiring shared rule to one of self-rule. The implications 
of this reality go beyond environmental concerns. For example, this has been illustrated 
recently by states implementing their own immigration laws in response to constituents’ 
dissatisfaction with federal legislative activity on that issue (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2011; 
Newton, 2008). 
Our results also document how, regardless of venue, local concerns are foremost in the 
rhetoric, if not the concerns, of elected officials. This has a number of important ramifica-
tions. First, it provides a rationale for venue shopping easily explicable to constituents and 
palatable to elected officials operating in the venue being vacated advocating for policy 
change. Second, while we demonstrate elected officials tailor their arguments to the venue 
in which they are operating, the core elements of their arguments transfer readily between 
proponents working in different venues. Third, as we establish, the arguments of a state’s 
Congressional delegation are more in sync with the arguments proposed by legislators 
within that state than members of Congress from other states. It would be worth testing 
whether such congruence is a predictor of venue shopping. Fourth, however compelling 
scientific evidence may be in explaining risk to the natural environment, commitment to 
addressing local constituents’ immediate concerns is weighted more heavily. This is true 
at both the state and federal venue for elected officials whose constituents are experiencing 
duress. 
Our results also provide us with further insight into the use of framing. We can see how 
federal and state legislators from North Dakota tailored their framing strategies to the ven-
ues in which they were operating. For example, federal legislators presented a more multi-
faceted argument than did their state counterparts. Federal legislators presented counter-
arguments to criticisms that were not as nearly well developed in state-level deliberations. 
The framing reflected the target audience and who needed to be satisfied about what con-
cerns. At the same time, some of the framing strategies employed between the two levels 
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of government overlapped, with both sets of legislators emphasizing the local conse-
quences of flooding. 
We think comparing how federal and state legislators approach analogous concerns is 
valuable to gain insights into how issues play out similarly or differently in different ven-
ues. At the same time, we acknowledge such comparisons are not unproblematic. For ex-
ample, while testimony is generated for Congressional committee hearings, in North 
Dakota records of committee meetings took the form of minutes. We believe there is even 
more to be understood about the federal system through the use of comparative framing 
research at the state and federal levels than just the evidence we have presented in this 
analysis. Further investigation will provide scholars of policy with a greater understand-
ing of how policy is made across a federalist system of governance. 
This research also demonstrates the feasibility and ease of venue shopping when the 
arguments from one venue are readily transferred to another. While such a shift served 
well the local interests of North Dakotans, the change of venue effectively precluded wider 
debate over the consequences of building an outlet for those downstream. Such a shift is 
particularly troubling for environmental-related concerns that not unusually have conse-
quences beyond the jurisdiction initially implicated. Given that hearings at the federal level 
are more likely to invoke the concerns of other states as to the consequences of proposed 
action, this ease in venue shopping has the capacity to lead to policies troubling for other 
governments within the United States system of federalism. Consequently, we believe it to 
be advantageous to study further the use of policy framing and information use when pol-
icy advocates shift their attention to the state level when they do not obtain results at the 
federal level. 
While science has been a tool in political deliberations in other situations (Litfin, 2000; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2005; Weible, 2008), it would be hard to make the case that it was a sig-
nificant consideration in the framing of proponents’ arguments for building an outlet in 
the state and federal legislative committee hearings examined. This provides further evi-
dence science is neither smoothly nor linearly inserted into policy (Demeritt, 2001; Jørstad 
& Skogen, 2010; Lövbrand 2007). Yet if decisions are to be grounded in reality, incorporat-
ing environmental science into policy is critical (Bocking, 1997; Jørstad & Skogen, 2010; 
Pielke, 2007). There is evidence this may happen in the management of the waters of the 
binational Hudson Bay drainage basin in the aftermath of the construction of the Devils 
Lake outlet to the Sheyenne River. The conclusion by the Bensley et al. (2011) report that 
waters from Devils Lake do not pose a definite threat to downstream water quality and 
ecology of waters contributed to alleviating political tension and enabling a collaborative 
policy environment among the State of North Dakota, the US government, the Province of 
Manitoba, and the Canadian government (Michaels & Gruszczynski, 2013). 
 
Acknowledgments – The research for this paper was made possible with the support of the Cana-
dian Studies Research Grant Program, Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC, the University of Ne-
braska Foundation Fund for Research on the US Congress, Lincoln, Nebraska, and the University of 
Nebraska Foundation Senning Fellowship, Lincoln, Nebraska. Thanks go to Grace York, University 
of Michigan, for making key documents available; Matt Hovland, North Dakota State Library, for 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
17 
accessing State Legislative Assembly Journals; Kristin Koch, Joan Larson, and Adam Simons, Uni-
versity of Nebraska, for supplying research assistance; Michael W. Wagner, University of Wisconsin, 
for providing technical advice; Monica Gattinger, University of Ottawa, for pointing us toward key 
references; Katherine Hunt, University of Nebraska, for providing editorial assistance; Tanya Heik-
kila, University of Colorado, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft. 
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 71st Annual National Conference Midwest 
Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois. The research was conducted at 
the University of Nebraska. 
 
Notes on contributors 
 
Dr. Mike Gruszczynski is an assistant professor of political science at Austin Peay State 
University. His primary areas of interest are political communication and psychology. 
Dr. Sarah Michaels is a professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty 
fellow in the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska. Her research interests are in 
water resources policy and governance, the interfaces between science and policy, com-
parative environmental policy, and regional governance. Her current work explores un-
certainty in environmental decision making. 
 
References 
 
Adler, J. H. (2007). When is two a crowd? The impact of federal action on state environmental regu-
lation. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 31, 67–114. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics (1st ed.). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (2009). Agendas and instability in American politics (2nd ed.). Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., De Boef, S. L., & Boydstun, A. E. (2008). The decline of the death penalty and the 
discovery of innocence. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Bednar J. (2006). Is full compliance possible? Conditions for shirking with imperfect monitoring and 
continuous action spaces. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18(3), 347–375. doi:10.1177/095162980606 
5012 
Bednar J. (2009). The robust federation: Principles of design. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Bednar J. (2011). The political science of federalism. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 7, 269–
288. doi:10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102510-105522 
Bensley, M., Dick, T. A., Hudson, C., Lumsden, J. S., Peters, K. K., Souter, B. W., . . . Nelson, R. (2011). 
Devils Lake–Red River Basin Fish Parasite and Pathogen Project: Qualitative Risk Assessment 
(Prepared for the International Red River Board and International Joint Commission, 46 pages). 
Bocking, S. (1997). Ecologists and environmental politics: A history of contemporary ecology. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Bradley, C. A. (1998). The treaty power and American federalism. Michigan Law Review, 97(2), 390–
461. doi:10.2307/1290290 
Chubb, J. E. (1985). The political economy of federalism. The American Political Science Review, 79(4), 
994–1015. doi:10.2307/1956245 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
18 
Cunningham-Parmeter, K. (2011). Forced federalism: States as laboratories of immigration reform. Has-
tings Law Journal, 62, 1673–1727. 
Demeritt, D. (2001). The construction of global warming and the politics of science. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 91(2), 307–337. doi:10.1111/0004-5608.00245 
Doan, A., & McFarlane, D. R. (2012). Saying no to abstinence-only education: An analysis of state 
decision-making. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 42(4), 613–635. doi:10.1093/publius/pjr052 
Elazar, D. (1987). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. 
Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). Shaping abortion discourse: Democracy 
and the public sphere in Germany and the United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Fiorina, M. P. (1974). Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. Research in Po-
litical Sociology, 3, 137–177. 
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A 
constructionist approach. The American Journal of Sociology, 95(1), 1–37. doi:10.1086/229213 
Gerrity, J. C. (2009). Building a framing campaign: Interest groups and the debate on partial-birth 
abortion. In B. F. Schaffner & P. J. Sellers (Eds.), Winning with words (pp. 60–77). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Ginsberg, F. D. (1989). Contested lives: The abortion debate in an American community. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press. 
Gruszczynski, M. W., & Michaels, S. (2012). The evolution of elite framing following enactment of 
legislation. Policy Sciences, 45(4), 359–384. doi:10.1007/s11077-012-9153-y 
Handler, J. F. (1978). Social movements and the legal system: A theory of law reform and social change. New 
York, NY: Academic Press. 
Harris, Douglas B. (2009). Partisan framing in legislative debates. In B. F. Schaffner & P. J. Sellers 
(Eds.), Winning with words: The origins and impacts of political framing (pp. 41–59). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Hearne, R. R. (2007). Evolving water management institutions in the red river basin. Environmental 
Management, 40(6), 842–852. doi:10.1007/s00267-007-9026-x 
Hedlund, R. D. (1984). Organizational attributes of legislatures: Structure, rules, norms, resources. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 9(1), 51–121. doi:10.2307/439522 
Hoppe, R., & Peterse, A. (1993). Handling frozen fire. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Iyengar, S. (1994). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Jerit, J. (2008). Issue framing and engagement: Rhetorical strategy in public policy debates. Political 
Behavior, 30(1): 1–24. 
Jewell, M. E. (1982). Representation in state legislatures. Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky.  
Jørstad, E., & Skogen, K. (2010). The Norwegian red list between science and policy. Environmental 
Science and Policy, 13, 115–122. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.12.003 
Kellstedt, P. M. (2005). Media frames, core values, and the dynamics of racial policy preferences. In 
K. Callaghan & F. Schnell (Eds.), Framing American politics (pp. 167–178). Pittsburgh, PA: Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press. 
Kempf, B. (2007). Draining Devils Lake: The international lawmaking problems created by the Devils 
Lake outlet. The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 19, 239–274. 
Kingdon, J. W. (2010). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Longman. 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
19 
Krippendorff, K. H. (2003). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd ed.). New York, 
NY: Sage Publications. 
Ku, J. G. (2006). Gubernatorial foreign policy. The Yale Law Journal, 115(9), 2380–2415. doi:10.2307/ 
20455700 
Lasswell, H. D., Lerner, D., & de Sola Pool, I. (1952). The comparative study of symbols, an introduction. 
Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lindblom, C. E. (1968). The policy-making process. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Litfin, K. T. (2000). Advocacy coalitions along the domestic-foreign frontier: Globalization and Ca-
nadian climate change policy. Policy Studies Journal, 28(1): 236–252. 
Lövbrand, E. (2007). Pure science or policy involvement? Ambiguous boundary-work for Swedish 
carbon cycle science. Environmental Science and Policy, 10, 39–47. doi:10.1016/j. envsci.2006.10.003 
Ma, J., Hipel, K.W., & De, M. (2011). Devils Lake emergency outlet diversion conflict. Journal of Envi-
ronmental Management, 92(3), 437–447. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.08.027 
Ma, K. (2008). Canada-US relations and the Devils Lake dispute. In B. W. Tomlin, N. Hillmer, and F. 
O. Hampson (Eds.), Canada’s international policies: Agendas, alternatives, and politics (pp. 317–331). 
Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada. 
Maestas, C. (2003). The incentive to listen: Progressive ambition, resources, and opinion monitoring 
among state legislators. The Journal of Politics, 65(2), 439–456. 
May, P. J., Sapotichne, J., & Workman, S. (2006). Policy coherence and policy domains. Policy Studies 
Journal, 34(3), 381–403. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00178.x 
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
Michaels, S., & Gruszczynski, M. W. (2013). Uptake of environmental science by legislators in Canada and 
the United States. Washington, DC: Research and Academic Relations, Canadian Embassy. 
Moncrief, G., Thompson, J. A., & Cassie, W. (1996). Revisiting the state of U. S. State legislative re-
search. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 21(3), 301–335. doi:10.2307/440247 
Mooney, C. Z. (1991). Information sources in state legislative decision making. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 16(3), 445–455. doi:10.2307/440107 
Mooney, C. Z. (1995). Citizens, structures, and sister states: Influences on state legislative profession-
alism. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 20(1), 47–67. doi:10.2307/440149 
Newton, L. (2008). Illegal, alien, or immigrant: The politics of immigration reform. New York, NY: New 
York University Press. 
Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2005). Bureaucratic competition in the policy process. Policy Studies Journal, 
33(3): 341–361. 
Nie, M. (2004). State wildlife policy and management: The scope and bias of political conflict. Public 
Administration Review, 64(2), 221–233. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00363.x 
North Dakota House. (2001). North Dakota Journal of the House 57th Session of the Legislative As-
sembly. 
North Dakota House. (2003). North Dakota Journal of the House 58th Session of the Legislative As-
sembly. 
North Dakota Senate. (1999). Fifty-sixth Legislative Assembly of North Dakota Senate Bill No. 2188. 
Statewide Water Development and Bonds. 
North Dakota Senate. (2001). North Dakota Journal of the Senate 57th Session of the Legislative As-
sembly. 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
20 
North Dakota Senate. (2003). North Dakota Journal of the Senate 58th Session of the Legislative As-
sembly. 
Ostrom, V. (1973). The intellectual crisis in American public administration. Tuscaloosa, AL: University 
of Alabama Press. 
Pielke, R. (2007). The honest broker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Potoski M. (2001). Clean air federalism: Do states race to the bottom? Public Administration Review, 
61(3), 335–343. doi:10.1111/0033-3352.00034 
Pralle, S. B. (2003). Venue shopping, political strategy, and policy change: The internationalization 
of Canadian forest advocacy. Journal of Public Policy, 23(3), 233–260. doi:10.1017/S0143814X03003118 
Rabe, B. G. (2013). Political impediments to a tobacco endgame. Tobacco Control, 22, i52–i54. doi: 
10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2012-050799  
Reich, G., & Mendoza, A. A. (2008). “Educating Kids” versus “Coddling criminals”: Framing the 
debate over in-state tuition for undocumented students in Kansas. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 
8(2), 177–197. doi:10.1177/153244000800800204 
Rochefort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. (1994). The politics of problem definition. Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas. 
Rose, R. (1976). Models of change. In R. Rose (Ed.), The dynamics of public policy: A comparative analysis 
(pp. 7–33). London: Sage Publications. 
Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (Eds.). (1993). Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition ap-
proach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework: An assessment. In P. 
Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 117–166). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Schaffner, B. F., & Atkinson, M. L. (2009). Taxing death or estates? When frames influence citizens’ 
beliefs. In B. F. Schaffner & P. J. Sellers (Eds.), Winning with words (pp. 121–135). New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Schlager, E., & Blomquist, W. (2008). Embracing watershed politics. Boulder: University Press of Colo-
rado. 
Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. M. (1997). Policy design for democracy. Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas. 
Squire, P. (1993). Professionalization and public opinion of state legislatures. The Journal of Politics, 
55(2), 479–491. doi:10.2307/2132277 
Squire, P. (2007). Measuring state legislative professionalism: The squire index revisited. State Politics 
& Policy Quarterly, 7(2), 211–227. doi:10.1177/153244000700700208 
Steensland, B. (2008). Why do policy frames change? Actor-idea coevolution in debates over welfare 
reform. Social Forces, 86(3), 1027–1054. doi:10.1353/sof.0.0027 
Stone, D. (2001). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making (2nd ed.). New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Co. 
Stone, D. (2011). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making (3rd ed.). New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
Stone, D. A. (1988). Policy paradox and political reason. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, and Company. 
Straus, R. M. (2011). Citizens’ use of policy symbols and frames. Policy Sciences, 44(1), 13–34. doi:10 
.1007/s11077-010-9115-1 
Swaine E. T. (2003). Does federalism constrain the treaty power? Columbia Law Review, 103(3), 403–
533. doi:10.2307/1123717 
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
21 
Tarry, S. E. (2001). Issue definition, conflict expansion, and tort reform: Lessons from the American 
general aviation industry. Policy Studies Journal, 29(4), 571–587. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2001.tb02 
111.x 
Tzoumis, K. (2001). Environmental policymaking in congress: The role of issue definitions in wetlands, great 
lakes and wildlife policies (1st ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. 
United States Congress (2002). 107th Congress 2D Session S. 2784 Report No. 107–220 Making Ap-
propriations for energy and water development for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003. 
Wagner, M. W. (2009). Great communicators? The influence of presidential and congressional issue 
framing on public opinion and party identification. In B. F. Schaffner & P. J. Sellers (Eds.), Win-
ning with words: The origins and impacts of political framing (pp. 136–158). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Weber, R. P. (1990). Basic content analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Weible, C. M. (2008). Expert-based information and policy subsystems: A review and synthesis. Pol-
icy Studies Journal, 36(4): 615–635. 
Whorley, D. (2008). The Devils Lake outlet and Canada-U.S. transboundary water relations; or, how 
George C. Gibbons got the last laugh. Hamline Law Review, 31(3), 615–638. 
  
G R U S Z C Z Y N S K I  &  M I C H A E L S ,  J O U R N A L  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  6  (2 0 1 4 )  
22 
Appendix 1. Frame Coding List 
 
Broad category – Uses 
Water quality 
Improved water quality from manipulation 
Manipulation decreases salinity 
Manipulation benefits downstream water quality interests 
Economic uses 
Economic growth from manipulation 
Job creation through water development 
Jobs for returning troops 
Expand national economy 
Economic need for water supply 
Flood control uses 
Flood control 
Debate over apportionment of flood control benefits 
Flood control should be primary concern 
Agricultural uses 
Increase agricultural economy 
Irrigation needs 
Preservation of agrarian way of life 
Increase family farms 
Irrigation expands agricultural production 
Expansion of usable agricultural land 
Irrigation expands land use efficiency 
Irrigation stabilizes agriculture 
Increase agricultural diversity 
Does not increase agricultural diversity 
Increases agricultural land value 
Feed the world 
Feed the nation 
Irrigation uses practical 
Irrigation uses not practical 
Aquifer recharge 
Drainage of nonirrigable land 
Irrigation should be primary concern 
Industrial uses 
Industrial development 
Industrial water supply 
Produce raw materials for industry 
Protection of industry 
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Energy uses 
General power needs 
Increase hydroelectric supply 
Cheaper power from manipulation 
Transportation/navigation uses 
General navigation needs 
Increased water navigation for economic development 
Will not increase water navigation 
Need for water as transportation tool 
Plan must include railroad infrastructure protection 
Military uses 
Water supply for military bases 
Protection of military bases 
Manipulation increases national security 
Recreational uses 
Economic benefits of water recreation 
Increase recreational fisheries 
Increase water recreation 
Increase migratory bird resources 
Do not increase migratory bird resources 
Develop wildlife resources 
Must make provisions for fish/wildlife resources 
Debate over fish/wildlife provisions 
Conservation of wildlife resources 
Population uses 
Drinking water supply needs 
Population growth needs 
Community protection 
Rural flight mitigation 
Domestic/municipal water supply 
Engineering uses 
General engineering questions 
Water stability from manipulation 
Water instability from manipulation 
Water stability as result of dams 
Water instability from dams 
Water stability from levees 
Water instability from levees 
Cross-basin transfer for water stability 
Water conservation most suitable solution 
No connection between inlet/outlet plans 
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Connection between inlet/outlet plans 
Must take holistic approach to solution 
Manipulation only one consideration in solution 
Control of water resources necessary 
Manipulation is technically sound 
Manipulation not technically sound 
Soil erosion protection 
Unused manipulation water should be returned to parent river 
Must use water most effectively 
Enough water for manipulation 
Broad category – Impacts 
Water quality impacts 
Downstream water quality impact from manipulation 
Downstream water quality concerns not serious 
Need to examine downstream water quality concerns 
Uncontrolled water quantity without manipulation 
Uncontrolled water quality without manipulation 
Impact of flooding on water quality 
Water treatment necessary 
Operation of manipulation must meet water quality standards 
Dissolved solids concerns 
Pesticide concerns 
Sulfate concerns 
Nitrogen concerns 
Siltation concerns 
Ecological impacts 
General ecological impact 
Ecological costs outweigh benefits 
Manipulation must be environmentally sound 
Environmental safeguards must be reasonable 
Environmental impact must be investigated 
No significant environmental impact from manipulation 
Waterfowl/waterfowl habitat impact 
Wildlife impact from manipulation 
Fish and wildlife mitigation costs 
Failure to preserve natural resources 
Wetlands impact 
Biota transfer concerns 
Cost of biota treatment necessary expense 
Biota treatment necessary requirement 
Invasive species concerns 
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Economic impacts 
Economic impact of flooding 
Economic impact of drought 
Negative economic impact of manipulation 
Negative economic impact of dike raising 
Loss of tax revenue from manipulation 
Agricultural impacts 
Impact of flooding on agriculture 
Impact of drought on agriculture 
Irrigation uses do not negatively impact other water uses 
Loss of farmland from manipulation 
Industrial impacts 
Disruption of industry by flooding 
Energy impacts 
Impact of drought on power supply 
Impact of manipulation on electricity production 
Transportation/navigation impacts 
Impact of drought on navigation 
Impact of manipulation on navigation 
Impact of flooding on transportation 
Military impacts 
Flood impact on military bases 
Drought impact on military bases 
Disruption of war industry by flood 
Recreational impacts 
Impact of flooding on recreation 
Impact of drought on recreation 
Population impacts 
Impact of drought on water supply 
Impact of flooding on community way of life 
Impact of drought on community way of life 
Impact of drought on population 
Loss of human life from flooding 
Loss of homes from flooding 
Impact of drought on medical services 
Engineering impacts 
Flood impact on levees 
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Broad category – Other frames 
Cost-benefit frames 
Economic benefits outweigh costs 
Economic costs outweigh benefits 
Manipulation must be economically feasible 
Manipulation is economically feasible 
Need federal funds for manipulation 
State will partially fund manipulation 
Manipulation will pay for itself 
Manipulation compensates for past sacrifices 
Governance frames 
Debate over agency control of project 
Water control should go to Corps of Engineers 
Conflict of interest in agency preparation of EIS 
Law/treaty frames 
Manipulation must comply with NEPA 
Manipulation must comply with BWT 
Manipulation will comply with NEPA 
Manipulation will comply with BWT 
Manipulation does not comply with NEPA 
Congressional authorization needed for cross basin transfer 
Public opinion frames 
Strong support for manipulation 
Public opposition to manipulation 
Public opinion needs to be gauged 
Scientific information frames 
Criticism of lack of scientific information 
Scientific assessments not in agreement 
Drought projections inflated 
Flood projections inflated 
